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CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-MIRANDA WARN­
INGS NOT REQUIRED WHERE THERE Is No OBJECTIVE DETER­
MINATION OF "CUSTODY": EFFECT OF SUSPECT'S PAROLEE STAT­
US. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977). 
Carl Mathiason, a parolee under supervlSlon, became impli­
cated in a burglary.1 An Oregon police officer tried three or four 
times unsuccessfully to contact Mathiason and eventually left his 
card at Mathiason's apartment with a note asking him to call. 
Mathiason contacted the officer and a meeting was arranged at a 
"convenient" location, the state patrol office. 2 Soon after his arrival, 
Mathiason was taken into an office, the door was closed and he was 
informed that he was not under arrest. The officer advised the de­
fendant that the police believed he was involved in a burglary and 
falsely stated that his fingerprints were found at the scene. After a 
few moments, Mathiason admitted that he had taken the property. 
At that point the officer advised the defendant of his Miranda 
rights3 and took a taped confession. Mterwards Mathiason was 
again informed that he was not under arrest and that the case 
would be refc-rred to the district attorney for a determination of 
whether charges would be brought. 4 Mathiason left the patrol of­
fice approximately one-half hour after he had arrived. 
The defendant was convicted of first degree burglary. At the 
trial he moved to suppress his confession, arguing that it was the 
result of a custodial police interrogation not preceded by the re­
1. An officer of the Oregon State Police, while investigating a theft, asked the 
burglary victim if she suspected anyone. She replied that Carl Mathiason, a parolee 
and a "close associate" of her son, was the only one she could imagine. 429 U.S. at 
~3. • 
2. The building housed several state agencies and was located about two blocks 
from Mathiason's apartment. Mathias~n had expressed no preference as to where the 
meeting should take place. Id. 
3. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966), the Supreme Court held 
that prior to an in-custody police interrogation the suspect must be informed that he 
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him, that he 
has the right to have an attorney present during interrogation, and that if he cannot 
afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him at government expense. See text 
accompanying notes 9-12 infra. 
4. The officer gave all testimony relevant to this issue. The defendant did not 
take the stand either at the hearing on the motion to suppress or at the trial. 429 U.S. 
at 494. 
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quired Miranda warnings. 5 The trial court denied the motion be­
cause it found that Mathiason was not in custody at the time of his 
confession. The state's intermediate appellate court unanimously af­
firmed. 6 The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed and remanded7 
holding that, although Mathiason had not been arrested or other­
wise formally detained, the interrogation took place in a "coercive 
environment" of the sort to which Miranda was intended to apply. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and by a di­
vided opinion again reversed. 8 In a per curiam disposition the 
Court held that Miranda warnings are required only where there 
has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 
"in custody." 
In Miranda v. Arizona9 the Supreme Court set forth the rules 
of police procedure applicable to police interrogation. In a "custo­
dial interrogation" situation, where the suspect is in custody at 
the time of the questioning, certain procedural safeguards are 
employed to protect the rights of the accused. 10 The most difficult 
issue raised by Miranda is the determination of the particular point 
at which the warnings are required. l1 This issue of precisely when 
5. It should be noted that the defendant's formal taped confession was pre­
ceded by the required warnings. However, his initial admission of guilt was elicited 
by police interrogation before the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights. The 
attempt to exclude all of the admissions flowing from the initial allegedly improper 
police interrogation is an application of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine 
which calls for the exclusion of all evidence derived from a constitutional violation. 
See United States v. Cassell, 452 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1971) (applying "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine to evidence obtained from a Miranda violation). 
6. 22 Or. App. 494, 539 P.2d 1122 (1975). 
7. 275 Or. 1,549 P.2d 673 (1976). 
8. 429 U.S. 492 (1977). Justice Marshall dissented on the merits; Justice Bren­
nan and Justice Stevens dissented from the summary disposition. 
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
10. See note 3 supra. The basic aim of Miranda is to secure the individual's 
privilege against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 444. It has been commented that 
Miranda was intended to overcome the dangers inherent in a police station interro­
gation by achieving the following four general goals: (1) Overcome the compelling 
atmosphere of the interrogation; (2) overcome the more sophisticated pressures on 
the individual to speak; (3) eliminate real or supposed police abuses in the course of 
interrogation; and (4) protect the evidentiary value of confessions or inculpatory 
statements by ensuring their voluntary nature. Smith, The Threshold Question In 
Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C. L. REV. 699, 
700-02 (1974). 
11. "[Tlhe true difficulty with the warning requirement is simply the lack of a 
clear and properly restricted description of those situations in which the warnings 
must be given." Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the 
Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1320, 1384 (1977) (footnote omitted). 
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a "custodial interrogation" exists has been a source of prolific liti­
gation. 12 
The history of Mathiason exemplifies the continuing confusion 
over the issue of custodial interrogation. The Oregon Supreme 
Court in a divided opinion (4-3) reversed its Court of Appeals on 
this issue, and subsequently was itself reversed by a similarly di­
vided (6-3) United States Supreme Court. 13 It is obvious that 
reasonable people differ in their opinions of what constitutes "cus­
todial interrogation" for Miranda purposes. Mathiason also raises 
the issue of the effect of a suspect's parolee status upon the deter­
mination of whether a given set of circumstances amounts to "cus­
tody. "14 This note will examine the test the Supreme Court used to 
define "custodial interrogation," and whether the Court's treatment 
of the "parolee status" issue is consistent with this test. 
The Supreme Court in Miranda defined "custodial interroga­
tion" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after 
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of 
his freedom of action in any significant way. "15 In its most recent 
consideration of the application of Miranda prior to Mathiason, 
Beckwith v. United States,16 the Court stressed that the crucial 
issue in determining precisely when there has been a "significant" 
deprivation of freedom of action is the custodial nature of the inter­
rogation. The Beckwith Court held that Miranda warnings were not 
required before two IRS agents questioned an individual at his 
home when there was no finding of custodial circumstances. 17 
12. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); People v. Wilson, 268 Cal. App. 2d 
581, 74 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1968); Doe v. Chang, 58 Haw. Adv. Sh. No. 6261, 564 P.2d 
1271 (1977); State v. Love, 546 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. App. 1977); People v. Allen, 28 App. 
Div. 2d 724, 281 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1967). See Smith, supra note 10. See generally Annot., 
31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970). 
13. See notes 7 & 8 supra. 
14. Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Mathiason, expressed the view that the 
parole status of the suspect at the time of the interrogation was a fact of particular 
importance, but that it might lend support to inconsistent conclusions. One possible 
conclusion is that since the state has greater power to question a parolee about his 
activities than it does an ordinary individual the warnings may not be required. The 
other is that since the parolee remains technically in legal custody, on a formal cus­
tody analysis he or she should always be warned. 429 U.S. at 499-500. See text ac­
companying notes 95-96 infra. 
15. 384 U.S. at 444. 
16. 425 U.S. 341 (1976). 
17. The Court viewed the narrow issue dealt with by the Miranda Court as 
"'the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to 
custodial police interrogation.''' 425 U.S. at 345 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
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The vague definition of "custodial interrogation" given in 
Miranda has required lower federal and state courts to decide on a 
case-by-case basis whether a particular suspect was "in custody" 
when interrogated. 18 Almost all of these courts agree that the de­
tennination of custodial interrogation must be made after consider­
ation of the totality of the circumstances. 19 The most important 
circumstances identified by the courts as bearing on the deter­
mination of "custodial interrogation" have been classified under the 
following general headings: (1) "The nature of the interrogator;" (2) 
"the nature of the suspect;" (3) "the time and place of the interro­
gation;" (4) "the nature of the interrogation;" and (5) "the progress 
of the investigation at the time of the interrogation. "20 No one cir­
cumstance or set of circumstances has been held conclusive. 21 The 
decision whether a particular suspect was "in custody" at the time 
of interrogation will generally turn on the particular test used by 
the court to determine whether the suspect has been deprived of 
his or her freedom of action in a significant way. One commentator 
has grouped the tests which the courts use into three general clas­
sifications: (1) The focus test; (2) the subjective test; and (3) the 
objective test. 22 
The focus test centers on the extent to which the investigation 
has concen trated on the particular suspect. 23 It is an extension of 
U.S. 436, 439 (1966)). The Court cited Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), and 
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), with approval, stating "the Court specifically 
stressed that it was the custodial nature of the interrogation which triggered the ne­
cessity for adherence to the specific requirements of its Miranda holding." 425 U.S. at 
346. See note 49 infra. The Court noted that under some circumstances a noncustodial 
interrogation might have coercive aspects, but it indicated that this would only go to 
the ultimate issue of voluntariness and not to the issue of custody. 425 U.S. at 347. 
18. E.g., United States v. Akin, 435 F.2d 1011, 1012 (5th CiT. 1970), cert. de­
nied, 401 U.S. 1011 (1971) ("Because of the difficulty offormulating a precise defini­
tion of 'custodial interrogation' this Court takes a 'case-by-case' approach to resolving 
question of custodial interrogation."); United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373, 376 
(4th CiT. 1968) ("Precise refinements of the terms 'custody' and 'interrogation' will 
have to be developed on a case-by-case basis."); State v. McLain, 367 A.2d 213, 220 
(Me. 1976) ("[TJhe court must examine the facts of each particular case to determine 
whether the line between general investigation and custodial interrogation has been 
crossed."); Burton v. State, 32 Md. App. 529, 533, 363 A.2d 243, 246 (1976) ("The 
concept of custody, for applying the Miranda rule, must be determined on a case­
to-case basis."). 
19. E.g., United States v. Harrison, 265 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); State v. 
Lewis, 373 A.2d 603 (Me. 1977); State v. Williams, 522 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. App. 1975). 
20. Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565, 577 (1970). 
21. See generally id. 
22. Smith, supra note 10, at 707. 
23. See United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373 (4th CiT. 1968); United States v. 
Mendoza-Torres, 285 F. Supp. 629 (D. Ariz. 1968); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 
Pa. 541,226 A.2d 765 (1967). 
193 1978] NOTES 
the Supreme Court's rationale in Escobedo v. Illinois. 24 There it 
was held that certain rights attach when the "investigation is no 
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to 
focus on a particular suspect. ... "25 This test, always of question­
able validity when used by itself to determine whether a suspect is 
"in custody, "26 has recently been expressly rejected by the Su­
preme Court in Beckwith v. United States. 27 
Under the subjective test the court asks whether the particular 
individual being interrogated believed that he was in custody.28 
The logic of the subjective test is clear. "[T]he person who honestly 
but unreasonably thinks he is under arrest has been subjected to 
precisely the same custodial pressures as the person whose belief 
in this regard is reasonable. "29 Most courts which have ostensibly 
adopted the subjective test nevertheless usually make an objective 
"reasonable belief" determination. 3o In the view of these courts, a 
person's reasonable belief that he is in custody is equivalent to ac­
31tual custody for Miranda purposes. However, the problems of 
proof inherent in this test often compel courts to use an even more 
objective standard. 32 
24. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
25. Id. at 490. 
26. United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969), cerl. denied, 397 U.S. 
990 (1970); Smith, supra note 10, at 707-10. 
27. 425 U.S. 341 (1976). "Although the 'focus' of an investigation may indeed 
have been on Beckwith at the time of the interview in the sense that it was his tax 
liability which was under scrutiny, he hardly found himself in the custodial situation 
described by the Miranda Court as the basis for its holding." Id. at 347. 
28. See Hicks v. United States, 382 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (defendant's sub­
jective belief of arrest is one factor to consider in determining applicability of 
Miranda, but is not controlling). 
29. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, 
and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 105 (1968). 
30. United States v. Irion, 482 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1026 
(1973); United States v. Bekowies, 432 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v. 
Marabel, 445 Pa. 435, 283 A.2d 285 (1971). See Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 § 6 (1970) 
(collecting cases). 
31. The validity of the rationale behind the "reasonable belief" test has been 
widely recognized. "An accused's reasonable belief that he is in custody would ... 
be equally coercive for the purpose of waiver of rights in making a statement as if he 
were in actual custody." Milhouse v. State, 31 Md. App. 571, 579, 358 A.2d 262, 267 
(1976). Justice Marshall, dissenting in Mathiason, indicated his preference for such a 
test. "At the very least, if respondent entertained an objectively reasonable belief 
that he was not free to leave during the questioning, then he was 'deprived of his 
freedom of action in a significant way.' " 429 U.S. at 496 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)). However, the subjective test has been expressly rejected 
in some jurisdictions. See Freije v. United States, 408 F.2d 100 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
396 U.S. 859 (1969). 
32. Smith, supra note 10, at 714. 
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The objective test inquires into the actual extent to which the 
individual's freedom of action has been restrained. 33 The suspect's 
subjective belief, even if it is reasonable, or the progress of the 
investigation at the time of the interrogation, are immaterial. The 
controlling consideration is the formal restraint upon the individu­
al's freedom. Under this test the court evaluates the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation, searching for evidence that the sus­
pect was not free to leave at will. 34 Courts in the majority of juris­
dictions apply a purely objective test. 35 
The test which a particular court chooses to apply reflects that 
court's view of the underlying purpose of the Miranda decision. 
There are two widely held views of Miranda. The first view is that 
the custody requirement was established for the sake of administra­
tive efficiency. It easily and clearly identifies the moment at which 
a suspect's rights must be pointed out to him. 36 The second view is 
that, because of increased concern for safeguarding the individual's 
fifth amendment rights, full procedural safeguards must be made 
available at any stage of an investigation that may be deemed coer­
cive, whether or not it involves custody.37 A court that accepts the 
first view of Miranda will apply a purely objective test that seeks to 
determine if the warnings were given at the technically correct 
stage of the investigation. A court that follows the second view will 
apply a more subjective analysis to determine at what point the 
coercive nature of the interrogation was sufficient to necessitate the 
warnings. 38 
The Supreme Court in Mathiason clearly applied the objective 
test. In stressing that the defendant came voluntarily to the police 
station, was informed that he was not under arrest, and freely left 
33. See United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 
U.S. 990 (1970). 
34. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that the determina­
tion of whether the defendant was "in custody" or otherwise deprived of his freedom 
in some significant way must be made on an objective basis. "[I]n the absence of 
actual arrest, something must be said or done by the authorities, either in their man­
ner of approach or in the tone or extent of their questioning, which indicates that 
they would not have heeded a request to depart or to allow the suspect to do so." 
421 F.2d at 545. 
35. See Smith, supra note 10, at 711. 
36. Note, Extending Miranda to Administrative Investigations, 56 VA. L. REV. 
690, 700-02 (1970). 
37. Id. 
38. These opposing viewpoints formed the basis of the split between the major­
ity and the dissenters on the Supreme Court in the Mathis and Orozco decisions. See 
note 49 infra. 
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the police station at the end of the interview, the Court concluded 
"[i]t is clear from these facts that Mathiason was not in custody 'or 
othelWise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 
way.' "39 The Court rejected the notion that a "coercive environ­
ment" of the type that would necessitate Miranda warnings could 
be. found in a non-custody situation, stating that "Miranda warnings 
are required only where there has been such a restriction on a 
person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' It was that sort of 
coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made 
applicable, and to which it is limited. "40 The' Court criticized the 
Supreme Court of Oregon for reading Miranda "too broadly"41 in 
that it had based its decision solely on a finding of "coercive envi­
ronment. "42 The Supreme Court stated firmly that a finding of 
coercive environment alone is insufficient to trigger the need for 
Miranda warnings absent an independent finding of actual cus­
tody.43 
In making its objective analysis, the Court declined to con­
sider any possible subjective effects the coercive police tactics 
might have had upon the suspect, although such tactics clearly con­
tributed to the coercive nature of the interrogation and to the sus­
39. 429 U.S. at 495. The Court quotes the general definition of "custodial inter­
rogation" given in Miranda. See text accompanying note 15 supra. 
40. 429 U.S. at 495. 
41. [d. at 493. 
42. The Supreme Court of Oregon has reasoned as follows: 
We hold the interrogation took place in a "coercive environment." The 
parties were in the offices of the State Police; they were alone behind closed 
doors; the officer informed the defendant he was a suspect in a theft and 
the authorities had evidence incriminating him in the crime; and the defen­
dant was a parolee under supervision. We are of the opinion that this evi­
dence is not overcome by the evidence that the defendant came to the office 
in response to a request and was told he was not under arrest. 
275 Or. 1, 5, 549 P.2d 673, 675 (1976). 
43. In this regard, the Court stated: 
[A] noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies 
simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any 
formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took 
place in a "coercive environment." Any interview of one suspected of a . 
crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of 
the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which 
may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But -police 
officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom 
they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply 
because the questioning takes place in the station house, or hecause the 
questioned person is one whom the police suspect. 
429 U.S. at 495.. ' 
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pect's reasonable belief that he was not free to leave. 44 The ma­
jority concluded that "[ w ]hatever relevance [the officer's false 
statement about having discovered Mathiason's fingerprints at the 
scene] may have to other issues in the case, it has nothing to do 
with whether respondent was in custody for purposes of the 
Miranda rule. "45 Thus, by declining to consider the suspect's sub­
jective belief, in addition to rejecting the element of "coercive 
environment, "46 the Court has made application of Miranda de­
pendent solely upon an objective determination of restraint on 
freedom of movement. 
The Court drew support for this conclusion primarily from 
Mathis v. United States47 and Orozco v. Texas. 48 In Mathis, the 
Miranda principle was held applicable to questioning which took 
place in a prison setting during a suspect's term of imprisonment 
on a separate offense. In Orozco it was held that Miranda was 
applicable to questioning which took place in a suspect's home after 
he had been placed under arrest. In each instance the suspect of 
the interrogation was in actual custody at the time of the question­
ing. The custodial aspect of the interrogation, rather than its coer­
cive atmosphere or the suspect's subjective belief, was stressed as 
the primary basis for the holdings. 49 The Court in Mathiason, 
44. See LaFave, supra note 29, and accompanying text. 
45. 429 U.S. at 495-96. 
46. See note 43 supra. 
47. 391 U.S. 1 (1968). 
48. 394 U.S. 324 (1969). 
49. In Mathis the suspect was an inmate in a state prison when he was ques­
tioned by an IRS agent about his tax returns. The Court held that the suspect was 
entitled to Miranda warnings as tax investigations often lead to criminal prosecution 
and the supect was in custody at the time of the questioning. The Court rejected the 
government's contention that Miranda is applicable only to the questioning of one 
who is in custody in connection with the very case under investigation: 
There is no substance to such a distinction, and in effect it goes against the 
whole purpose of the Miranda decision which was designed to give mean­
ingful protection to Fifth Amendment rights. We find nothing in the 
Miranda opinion which calls for a curtailment of the warnings to be given 
per~:ms under interrogation by officers based on the reason why the person 
is in custody. 
391 U.S. at 4-5. 
In Orozco the suspect was confronted by four police officers in his boarding­
house at 4 a.m. and questioned about a recent homicide. The Court cited to Mathis 
on the "custody" requirement and held that the suspect was entitled to Miranda warn­
ings because of one officer's testimony that the suspect was under arrest and not free 
to leave at the time of the questioning. 394 U.S. at 325. 
Both of these decisions were handed down by a divided court. Justices Harlan, 
Stewart, and White dissented in Mathis, and Justices Stewart and White dissented in 
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however, gave little guidance as to precisely when the restrictions 
on an individual's freedom of action are "significant" enough to 
render him "in custody" for Miranda purposes when there is no 
actual imprisonment or actual arrest. 50 
Some critics have contended that Mathiason seriously restricts 
the scope and applicability of Miranda. One commentator has 
criticized the decision as a limitation of Miranda without a careful 
analysis of the issues presented. 51 However, although clearly not 
an expansion of Miranda, Mathiason is not the severe limitation 
upon it that these critics contend. Rather, Mathiason is a clearer 
enunciation of the proper standard for application of the Miranda 
principle. 52 To be sure, the decision indicates a rejection of a sub­
jective determination of custodial interrogation and also expressly 
Orozco, with Justice Harlan concurring solely on the basis of stare decisis. The dis­
senters in each case stressed the fact that Miranda was intended to guard against the 
coercive, hostile, and forbidding atmosphere surrounding police station interrogation 
and that no su~h coercive atmosphere was present in these instances. The majority 
rejected this reasoning and stressed that it was only the "in custody" element of the 
interrogation that triggered the need for Miranda warnings. 
50. In his dissent in Mathiason, Justice Marshall indicated that the mere for­
malities of arrest and imprisonment should not control application of Miranda safe­
guards. "It is true that respondent was not formally placed under arrest, but surely 
formalities alone cannot controL" 429 U.S. at 498. 
51. Note, Miranda Warnings Need Not Be Given Where There Is No Indication 
Of Actual Custody And Where The Defendant's Freedom to Depart Is Not In Fact 
Restricted, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 334 (1977). This commentator viewed the Mathiason 
Court's adoption of the "objectively determined custody" standard as a severe retrac­
tion of the original Miranda holding. "[S]uch a retraction [of Miranda] ought to be 
made via a reasoned policy analysis in the light of post-Miranda experience rather 
than a per curiam opinion which plays substanceless semantic games." Id. at 353. 
The Burger Court has frequently been criticized for substituting narrow, technical 
interpretations of constitutional guarantees for the expansive interpretation of those 
guarantees adopted by the Warren Court. Israel, supra note 11, at 1323. However, 
after a comparison of the decisions handed down by the Warren and Burger Courts, 
that commentator concludes that: 
[T]he Burger Court decisions on police practices have restricted the scope of 
various Warren Court rulings. Some of these restrictions, however, might 
well have been accepted by the Warren Court if the appropriate factual situ­
ations had been at issue before it. Also, the restrictions imposed so far have 
related primarily to collateral matters that do not substantially affect the 
practical impact of the major Warren Court decisions on police practices. 
Id. at 1326. 
52. Since Miranda was handed down in 1966 its application has been subject to 
varying interpretations by lower courts resulting in such divergent concepts as the 
"focus test," the "coercive environment test," and the "subjective-reasonable belief 
test." See text accompanying notes 22-32 supra. In Mathiason the Court has drawn 
the line on these divergent' views and indicated the proper scope for application of 
the Miranda principle; that is, an objective determination of "custody." 
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rejects the "coercive environment" test. 53 The analysis is narrowed 
to an objective search for "custody." The result may arguably be a 
modest limitation upon the scope of Miranda, 54 but the Court has 
not altered the basic premise of that landmark case. 55 Every crimi­
nal defendant is still to be afforded meaningful protection for his or 
her fifth amendment rights. 
Although it clarifies the proper application of Miranda, the de­
cision must be criticized for its failure to address the issue raised 
by the defendant's parolee status. A parolee under supervision who 
is subjected to police station interrogation clearly is deprived of his 
freedom of action significantly more than an ordinary individual 
under those circumstances. 56 Nonetheless, the majority in Ma­
thiason made no reference to the defendant'sparolee status in its 
objective determination of "custodial interrogation. "57 
There are three possible rationales for the decision to ignore 
Mathiason's parolee status. The Supreme Court may have reasoned 
that: (1) The parolee status of the suspect has no bearing upon 
custody for Miranda purposes, (2) consideration of parolee status in 
the custody determination will create difficult administrative prob­
lems, or (3) recognition of the suspect's parolee status will raise 
numerous related problems in other arguably custodial situations. 
In order to adequately explore these three possible rationales for 
the Court's treatment of this issue, it is necessary to understand 
both the legal and practical nature of the parole system. 
Parole is broadly defined as the release of an offender who has 
served only a portion of his sentence in a jail or prison. 58 The 
53. See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra. ~ 
54. The decision reached in Mathiason is not a radical departure from the Su­
preme Court's traditional application of the Miranda principle on the basis of cus­
tody. One commentator has observed that "[tlhe Court's conclusion in Mathiason that 
the suspect there had not been in 'custody' might well have been reached by the 
members of the Miranda majority themselves." Israel, supra note 11, at 1375 (foot­
note omitted). 
55. Miranda was intended to safeguard the individual's fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 444. 
56. See text accompanying notes 58-85 infra. 
57. As the key to the objective determination of custody applied by the majority 
is "deprivation of freedom of action," the parolee status of the suspect bears directly 
upon custody and thus merits some consideration. See text accompanying note 39 
supra. The Supreme Court of Oregon took this factor into consideration in making its 
determination of "coercive environment." See note 42 supra. Justice Stevens noted 
the importance of this factor in his dissent. See note 14 supra. 
58. L. CARNEY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: LEGAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 154 
(1977). 
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parolee remains in the "constructive," "legal," or "continued"59 
custody of the state. His activities are restricted and he is carefully 
supervised by the authorities. If the parolee violates the terms of 
the parole, he can be reincarcerated. 60 
Courts and commentators have developed three distinct 
theoretical bases for parole: the Grace theory, the Contract-Con­
sent theory, and the Custody theory. 61 Under the Grace theory 
parole is viewed as merely a privilege which the state has uncon­
trolled discretion to revoke. 62 Proponents of the Contract-Consent 
theory maintain that the parolee bargains to obtain a freedom qual­
ifIed by certain imposed conditions. 63 Under the Custody theory 
59. The use of such ambiguous terms as "constructive custody," "legal cus­
tody," and "continued custody" make it difficult to precisely define the legal status 
of the parolee. See note 66 infra. 
60. L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at 154. 
61. H. ABADINSKY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 201-02 
(1977); D. STANLEY, PRISONERS AMONG Us 1 (1976); L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at 
142-43; Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 702, 704-16 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Parole]. 
62. Theon) of Grace-The basic premise of this theory is that the convicted 
person has been denied his liberty in accordance with due process of law. See Fuller 
v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146 (1899). The state has the right to require this indi­
vidual to remain incarcerated for the full duration of the sentence. See In re Varner, 
166 Ohio St. 340, 142 N.E.2d 846 (1957). By providing for an earlier release by 
parole the state has acted ex gratia and has conferred no legally protected right to 
remain at liberty. Brown v. Kearney, 355 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1966). Parole is therefore 
a privilege and not a right. The parole board, under the theory of "uncontrolled 
discretion," is beyond control of the courts and can return a parolee to prison with­
out notice and without cause. State v. Horton, 31 Ala. App. 71, 14 So.2d 557, afI'd, 
244 Ala. 594, 14 So.2d 561 (1943). See L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at 142-43. The con­
stitutional validity of the Grace theory is questionable, especially with respect to the 
states' "uncontrolled discretion" to revoke. Some courts have held that a right to a 
hearing before revocation of parole or probation is a fundamental requirement of due 
process. Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 681, 32 So.2d 607 (1947); see generally Annot., 29 
A.L.R.2d 1074 (1953). The Grace theory has been expressly repudiated with respect 
to probation in Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969) and Hahn v. 
Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970), cerl. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971). 
63. Theory of Contract-Consent-This theory is founded on the same legal 
philosophy as the Theory of Grace, which is that the state has the absolute option of 
holding the convict in prison until the end of his term. See note 62 supra. Under this 
theory restoration of liberty is viewed as a contractual matter. The state yields its 
power to hold the convict for the duration of the sentence in consideration of the 
convict's consent to be bound by any conditions which the state may impose. See 
Lee v. Gough, 86 R.I. 23, 133 A.2d 779, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 874 (1957). The em­
phasis here is that the prisoner is free to refuse parole; but once it is accepted he 
or she is obligated to fulfill the imposed conditions. See L. CARl1IEY, supra note 58, 
at 142-43. The major criticism of the Contract-Consent theory is that parole is not 
actually a contract reached through bilateral bargaining. One commentator has noted 
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the parolee is considered to remain in "constructive custody" while 
concluding his sentence. 64 Under each of these theories the 
parolee's status is ambiguous. The parolee is not placed squarely at 
liberty or squarely in custody. The extent to which such terms as 
"continued custody," "constructive custody" or "legal custody" can 
be legally equated with actual physical custody is unclear. 65 
From a practical standpoint, this lack of a clearly defined 
status restricts the parolee's freedom by failing to delineate the 
boundaries of permissible conduct. The parolee is not afforded the 
constitutional rights of a free person, nor is he given the constitu­
tional protections of an individual in custody.66 This places the 
, 
that the prisoner has an unequal bargaining position and cannot really determine the 
conditions of his release. Parole, supra note 61, at 709. Further, the conditions of 
parole may be changed without the parolee's consent, so long as no additional 
punishment is imposed. Id. at 709 n.47. 
64. Theory of Custody-The proponents of this theory deny that the parolee 
has any liberty whatsoever. It is asserted that the parolee remains constantly in con­
structive custody and is merely given the privilege of concluding the sentence in the 
community. Bricker v. Michigan Parole Bd., 405 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. Mich. 1975); 
see L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at 142-43. Under this theory the courts have held that 
a parolee's station in the community is merely an extension of his prison cell be­
cause he is still serving his sentence. People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 297 
P.2d 451 (1956) (held that a parole officer's arbitrary search of a parolee's rented 
room was justified). This theory is the most widely accepted today, but it too has 
flaws. The major difficulty is that although the parolee allegedly remains in "con­
structive custody" his liberty may be recognized in some instances. For instance, if a 
parolee commits a crime while on parole, the parolee will be found at liberty in 
order to permit prosecution under the laws of another sovereign. E.g., Gilchrist v. 
Overlade, 233 Ind. 569, 122 N.E.2d 93 (1954). 
65. See note 59 supra. Trying to classify the parolee within the narrow defini­
tion of either "liberty" or "custody" has been a major source of confusion. One 
commentator has noted that: 
[Tjhe legislatures have contributed much toward the muddy thought in this 
area.... With one clause of the parole act the convict is placed at liberty, 
and with another he is placed in custody.... "[Aj prisoner at liberty shall 
be deemed to be still in the legal custody and under the control of the board" 
is the constant refrain of state paroling statutes. With this uncertain legisla­
tive mandate as their guide the courts have utilized the custody concept to 
confine the parolee within ever-expanding prison walls. 
Parole, supra note 61, at 711 (footnote omitted); L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at 171. 
66. Reliance on the narrow concepts of "liberty" and "custody" has forced the 
courts to define the parolee as at liberty for certain purposes and in custody for 
others, resulting in general uncertainty as to his actual status: 
By the simple expedient of finding the parolee at liberty the courts have 
managed to avoid a dangerous constitutional objection to the delegation of 
"sentencing authority" to the board. But if the parolee relies on his being at 
liberty, and demands a hearing, the court may easily avoid the constitutional 
problem by finding the parolee really in custody. Facile shifting of the con­
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parolee in a precarious position. He is not free to act as an ordinary 
individual, and any improper action may result in reincarceration 
with few of the procedural safeguards normally accorded those 
charged with crime. 67 
Although the . parolee' s exact status is uncertain, it is apparent 
that he is not entirely free in the legal sense any more than on a 
practical level. 'Each of the three theories accords the parolee less 
than total freedom. The first two describe a liberty qualified by 
certain conditions, the last contemplates a situation of continuing 
custody. Several recent federal and state decisions emphasize the 
legal restraints on freedom involved in parolee status. In Morrissey 
v. Brewer68 the Supreme Court defined parole as "release from 
prison, before the completion of sentence, on the condition that 
the. prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the sen­
tence. "69 In Bricker v. Michigan Parole Board70 it was held that 
"parole is a form of custody whereby the prisoner leaves his place 
of incarceration while remaining in the legal custody and control of 
the Board of Parole until termination of his sentence."71 In People 
v. Williams 72 it was stated that "[p]arole alters only the method 
and degree of confinement during the period of commitment. "73 
The court in People ex reI. Williams v. Morris 74 recognized that "a 
parolee remains at all times in the legal custody of the Department 
of Corrections and subject to the authority of the parole and par­
don board until the expiration of his sentence. "75 The language of 
cepts from liberty to custody and vice-versa has placed the judiciary and the 
parolee in a position where neither is quite certain what parole means. 
Parole, supra note 61, at 714-15 (footnotes omitted). See Gilchrist v. Overlade, 233 
Ind. 569, 122 N.E.2d 93 (1954). 
67. See note 99 infra. 
68. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
69. [d. at 477. 
70. 405 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. Mich. 1975). 
71. [d. at 1343. 
72. 66 Ill. 2d 179,361 N.E.2d 1110 (1977). 
73. [d. at 187, 361 N.E.2d at 1114. The case involved the question of whether 
the Department of Corrections' statutory authorization for parole, furlough, work re­
lease, day release, and other prison absence programs were an unconstitutional in­
fringement upon the judiciary's power to impose sentences in criminal cases. The 
court noted that, in a legal sense, parole does not alter a judicially imposed sentence 
or in any other way affect it. [d. 
74. 44 Ill. App. 3d 39, 357 N.E.2d 851 (1976). 
75. [d. at 40, 357 N.E.2d at 852 (citation omitted). However, the ambiguity of 
terms is demonstrated here as the court went on to hold that the praolee, although in 
legal custody, was not under physical control and not in actual custody so that man­
damus, rather than a writ of habeas corpus, was the proper remedy for petitioner to 
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these decisions demonstrates that the parolee's freedom is legally 
far more restricted than that of an ordinary citizen. 
Within the framework of his or her ambiguous legal status, the 
parolee's liberty is specifically restricted by the express conditions 
of the parole agreement, which regulate the parolee's conduct upon 
release. 76 Parole conditions can be grouped into two main types: 
"reform" conditions, that urge the parolee toward a noncriminal 
way of life, and "control" conditions, which enable the parole staff 
to adequately supervise him. 77 The type of conditions imposed 
often reflect the state's view of the function of parole. States that 
emphasize the protection of the community impose extensive 
parole conditions; those that stress rehabilitation impose a minimal 
number of conditions. 78 
The most prevalent conditions are those which regulate the 
parolee's movements (including interstate travel), involvement in 
criminal activities, drug abuse, association with undesirable com­
panions, and possession of deadly weapons. 79 In addition, practi­
cally every state has a statutory provision for "special conditions" 
which allows the imposition of specific restrictions, such as prohibi­
tion against contacting a former wife, traveling to a particular area, 
or making overtures to the victims of the commitment offense. 80 
It is evident that parole conditions have the ability to severely 
restrict the parolee's freedom of action. The Supreme Court has 
recognized that the conditions of parole restrict an individual's ac­
compel the Department of Corrections to terminate his sentence. The court noted 
that the position it took on parolee status was not universally accepted, and that a 
review of other states shows that those jurisdictions have split on the issue of 
whether the restraints imposed on a parolee are such as to enable him to maintain a 
state habeas corpus action. See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 682 (1963). 
76. The amount and nature of parole conditions vary by jurisdiction. The 
number of conditions range from in excess of twenty in New Mexico to only four in 
Washington. See D. STANLEY, supra note 61, at 82-83; L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at 
171. Moreover, there is little consistency as to the nature of parole conditions. 
"There are over fifty different parole rules in the nation's parole systems, yet not one 
of the fifty is universally employed in every parole jurisdiction." L. CARNEY, supra 
note 58, at 168 (citation omitted). 
77. D. STANLEY, supra note 61, at 82-83. 
78. L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at 172. 
79. Id. Other common restrictions include those on consuming alcoholic bever­
ages, incurring indebtedness, entering into sales contracts, contracting a new mar­
riage, driving or owning motor vehicles, changing employment or residence, and 
supporting dependents. A parolee may also be required to observe curfews, avoid 
prohibited places and associations, submit to home visitations by parole officers, and 
file mandatory monthly reports. Parole, supra note 61, at 720-33. 
80. L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at 174. 
203 1978] NOTES 
tivities substantially beyond the ordinary restrictions imposed by 
law on the average citizen. 81 These restrictive conditions func­
tion as a part of the parolee's punishment. 82 And, as indicated 
above, compliance with these conditions is required for continued 
parole. 83 
A further restriction upon the parolee's freedom is the dis­
cretionary manner in which parole conditions are enforced. " 'The 
strictness with which parole rules are enforced varies greatly from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depending in part on the training of the 
parole officer, but chiefly on the formal and informal policies of the 
parole system.' "84 This discretionary enforcement may transform a 
seemingly minor condition into a significant restriction. The Su­
preme Court has noted that, because of this element of discretion, 
even the most common provisions of a parole statute may result in 
a significant restraint upon the parolee's freedom. "Even the condi­
tion which requires [the parolee] not to violate any penal laws or 
ordinances, at first blush innocuous, is a significant restraint be­
cause it is the Parole Board members or the parole officer who 
will determine whether such a violation has occurred. "85 Thus the 
81. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478 (1972). 
82. "The parolees are fully aware that parole is part of their punishment and 
that they are 'paying their debt' by submitting to surveillance." D. STANLEY, supra 
note 61, at 81 (footnote omitted). 
83. The parole statutes generally grant the parole board great authority and dis­
cretion, allowing them to prescribe strict standards of conduct for the parolee and to 
reincarcerate for cause or on reasonable belief of a deviation. For example, the Ore­
gon parole statute establishes the following general conditions of parole: The parolee 
is to remain under the supervision of the Corrections Division and abide by its direc­
tion, answer all reasonable inquiries, report to the parole officer as directed, and 
respect and obey all local, state and federal laws. OR. REV. STAT. § 144.270(2) (1977). 
The statute further provides that the board has the discretion to suspend or revoke 
parole if it has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has violated these con­
ditions or if it determines that the parole is not in the best interests of either the 
parolee or society. let. § 144.331. The discretionary authority granted by the Ore­
gon statutory scheme is representative of the parole statutes of most jurisdictions. 
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3053 (Deering 1971) (the Adult Authority has power to 
impose "such conditions as it may deem proper" and revoke parole for non-·· 
compliance); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 133A (West 1974) (Parole Board may 
grant a permit upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe and these terms 
and conditions may be revised, altered, amended, or revoked by the board at any 
time). 
84. H. ABADINSKY, supra note 61, at 184 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON 
CRIME AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 69 
( 1966)). 
"[P]arole regulations are often petty and demeaning, 'or of such broad sweep 
that they lend themselves to arbitrary and selective enforcement by parole officers.' " 
[d. (quoting N.Y.S. SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA p. xix). 
85. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 n.19 (1963). 
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parole system, by its imposition of specific parole conditions, 
coupled with discretionary enforcement and an ambiguous legal 
status, restricts the freedom of the parolee in both a legal and a 
practical sense. 
Turning back to the possible reasons for the Court's failure to 
address the parole issue,86 the first to be considered is that the 
parolee status of the suspect has no bearing upon custody for 
Miranda purposes. It is clear that parole has the ability to place 
severe restraints on an individual's freedom of action. As the Court 
applied an objective determination of custody stressing "depriva­
tion of freedom of action in any significant way,"87 it cannot be said 
that the parolee status of a suspect under supervision has no bear­
ing upon custody. 
The Supreme Court itself has recognized that the restrictions 
imposed by the parole agreement may be sufficient to constitute 
custody in certain circumstances. In Jones v. Cunningham88 the 
Court held that the petitioner, a parolee, was in the "custody" of 
the Virginia Parole Board within the meaning of the federal habeas 
corpus statuteS9 because the parole order imposed conditions which 
significantly confined the prisoner and restrained his freedom. This 
restraint was deemed sufficient to maintain a federal habeas corpus 
action. The Court based its decision upon the restraint on pe­
titioner's liberty rather than on his actual physical custody.90 It 
86. See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra. 
87. See text accompanying note 39 supra. 
88. 371 U.S. 236 (1963). Petitioner was a state prisoner sentenced as a recidivist 
in Virginia. He filed a petition for habeas corpus in United States district court nam­
ing the penitentiary superintendent as respondent and alleging that his third­
offender sentence was based in part upon an invalid conviction. Shortly before the 
appeal stage petitioner was paroled by the Virginia Parole Board under a parole 
order which placed significant restrictions upon his liberty. Petitioner amended his 
complaint to name the Virginia Parole Board as respondent. 
89. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970). This section gives the Supreme Court, district 
court, and judges of the courts of appeals the power to grant a writ of habeas corpus 
to anyone whose liberty is unlawfully restrained. 
90. In a historical analysis the Court concluded that the remedy of habeas cor­
pus is not restricted to situations where the petitioner is in actual custody. "While 
petitioner's parole releases him from immediate physical imprisonment, it imposes 
conditions which significantly confine and restrain his freedom; this is enough to 
keep him in the 'custody' of the Virginia Parole Board within the meaning of the 
habeas corpus statute...." 371 U.S. at 243. Prior to this decision a majority of the 
federal courts had held that after a prisoner is paroled he is no longer in custody and 
hence the writ cannot lie. When the same issue was raised in a state proceeding, the 
Appellate Court of Illinois noted that the Jones decision is only the interpretation of 
a specific federal habeas corpus statute on a nonconstitutional basis, and thus, al­
though persuasive authority, is not binding on the state courts. People ex rei. Wil­
liams v. Morris, 44 Ill. App. 3d 39, 41, 357 N.E.2d 851, 853 (1976). 
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noted that. the Virginia statute provides that a paroled prisoner 
shall be released "into the custody of the Parole Board," and that 
the parole order places the petitioner "under the custody and con­
trol of the Virginia Parole Board. "91 The Court concluded that the 
custody and control of the Parole Board significantly restrained the 
petitioner's liberty to do those things which, in this country, free 
people are entitled to do. 92 
Although the Jones decision does not specifically define the 
legal status of a parolee, it indicates that the courts need not con­
fine themselves to the narrow definitions of "liberty" and "custody" 
but may deal with parole as a matter of restraint. 93 Under this 
analysis, parolee status is a proper subject for consideration in de­
termining custody under an objective test because it does involve 
"deprivation of freedom of action." 
The suspect's parolee status is especially important for the 
Miranda custody requirement when a station house interrogation 
is involved. The most widely recognized theory of parole is the 
Theory of Custody.94 If one accepts the basic premise of this 
theory, that the parolee remains in "constructive custody" while 
completing his sentence in the community, then an analogy is 
clearly suggested between parolee status and prisoner status which 
the Court has deemed to be custodial. In Mathis the Supreme 
Court held that Miranda warnings are required in questioning tak­
ing place in a prison setting during a suspect's term of imprison­
ment on a separate offense. 95 It reasonably follows that the warn­
ings should be required in questioning taking place in a station 
house setting during a parolee's term of "constructive custody" on a 
separate offense. 96 
91. 371 U.S. at 241-42. 
92. [d. at 242-43. The Court noted that: 

[pjetitioner is confined by the parole order to a particular community, house, 

and job at the sufference of his parole officer. He cannot drive a car without 

permission. He must periodically report to his parole officer, permit the of­

ficer to visit his home and job at any time, and follow the officer's advice. 

He is admonished to keep good company and good hours, work regularly, 





[d. at 242. 
93. Dealing with parole as a matter of restraint is a more accurate description of 
the situation and avoids the problems raised by classifying the parolee within the 
narrow definition of "liberty" or "custody." See note 65 supra. 
94. See note 64 supra. 
95. 391 U.S. at 4-5, accord, Hunt v. State, 2 Md. App. 443, 234 A.2d 785 (1967). 
See Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565, 643 (1970). 
96. The major difficulty with this type of theoretical analysis is that each of the 
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On a practical level, the restraint upon liberty imposed by 
parole is magnified in the coercive environment of a police station 
interrogation. The real dangers which the Miranda decision was 
designed to guard against are present here. 97 The parolee suspect, 
because of his precarious position, may reasonably and realistically 
feel compelled to remain and make statements which may ulti­
mately prove incriminating. 98 Because any action he takes im­
mediately jeopardizes his parole status,99 the parolee in this situa­
tion has been obJectively deprived of his freedom of action in a 
significant way. Station house interrogation transforms the so-called 
"constructive custody" of the parolee into the equivalent of actual 
custody for Miranda purposes. It places the individual in a coercive 
atmosphere, it significantly restricts his freedom, and it may com­
pel him to become a witness against himself. 
The next possible reason for the Court's failure to address the 
parolee status issue is the concern with creating real administrative 
problems. If parolee status were to be recognized as a factor bear-
three general theories of parole has been seriously criticized and none are uni­
versally accepted. See notes 62-64 supra. Even courts which adhere to the Theory of 
Custody often shift between the concepts of liberty and custody in order to deal with 
particular parole problems. See note 66 supra. 
97. Miranda was intended to protect the individual's privilege against self­
incrimination by overcoming the dangers inherent in a police station interrogation. 
See note 10 supra. 
98. Realistically, knowledge of the interrogee's parolee status gives the police 
interrogator a leverage in questioning this individual which is not present in the 
interrogation of an ordinary suspect. The opportunity for police abuses in the course 
of interrogation is much greater. The interrogator may compel the parolee suspect to 
speak merely by threatening to inform the parole officer of an alleged violation. The 
effect of deceptive police tactics, such as the officer's false statement in the instant 
case about having found the defendant's fingerprints at the scene of the crime, will 
have a greater impact on the parolee suspect and are more likely to create a realistic 
belief in the individual's mind that he is not free to leave. 
99. In Jones the Court observed: 

[The parolee] must not only faithfully obey [all] restrictions and conditions 

but he must live in constant fear that a single deviation, however slight, 

might be enough to result in his being returned to prison ... with few, if 

any, of the procedural safeguards that normally must be and are provided to 

those charged with crime. 

371 U.S. at 242 (footnote omitted). 
Any action that the parolee may take carries with it serious implications. If he 
attempts to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination and refuses to talk or 
leaves the interrogation, this may be deemed a sufficient basis, under the broad lan­
guage of the parole statutes, for a revocation of his parole. If the parolee chooses to 
remain and answer the questions, any admissions made in the course of interroga­
tion, although insufficient to charge the ordinary suspect with a crime, may be suffi­
cient to constitute a violation of parole and result in reincarceration. See note 83 
supra. 
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ing upon the Miranda custody requirement, many administrative 
difficulties would ensue. Adequate evaluation of the effect of a sus­
pect's parolee status in relation to "custody" would require a de­
termination of: (1) The existence of the parolee status itself, (2) how 
significantly the particular conditions of parole restrain this indi­
vidual's freedom of action, and (3) whether this restraint is suffi­
cient to constitute "custody" for Miranda purposes. These determi­
nations would be difficult to make on a case-by-case basis. 
Although parolee status is itself an objective criterion which 
may easily be established,l0o difficult problems would be encoun­
tered in making the other two determinations enumerated above. 
The source of the difficulty is the individual nature of the parole 
agreement. Each parolee may be subjected to a variety of indi­
vidual parole conditions. 101 Moreover, the restrictive effect of a 
particular condition will vary depending upon the jurisdiction's pol­
icy of parole enforcement. 102 It would be a difficult task for a court 
to determine the exact restrictive effect of a particular parole 
agreement. This determination would be impossible for the inter­
rogating officer to make at the time of the questioning. Even if the 
Court were to set out formal guidelines, it would be difficult to 
decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether the restrictive effect of the 
particular parole conditions was sufficient to constitute a signficant 
deprivation of the suspect's freedom of action. 
Although concern over administrative difficulties is realistic, 
this alone is an insufficient basis for the Court's avoidance of the 
parolee status issue. As a general rule, administrative efficiency is 
an inadequate justification for the denial of an individual's constitu­
tional rights. 103 In addition, there is a simple alternative which can 
eliminate, to a great extent, these administrative difficulties. In 
light of the potential dangers inherent in the station house interro­
gation of a parolee, and the great difficulties in making a case-by­
case determination of the parole's restrictive effect, it would be 
sensible for the Court to lay down a "blanket rule" requiring the 
reading of Miranda rights prior to any station house interrogation 
of a suspect known to be a parolee. 104 A blanket rule would elimi­
100. In the instant case the interrogating officer was aware of the suspect's 
parolee status prior to the interrogation. This status may just as easily be determined 
by a si~ple question at the beginning of any interrogation. 
101. See notes 76-80 supra and accompanying text. 
102. See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text. 
103. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
104. Cf. People v. Algien, 180 Colo. 1, 501 P.2d 468 (1972) (court laid down 
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nate many of the problems inherent in the case-by-case determina­
tion of custodial interrogation105 and would adequately deal with 
the nebulous quasi-custodial situation of parole. Administrative dif­
ficulties would be few. The only necessary determinations would 
be that the suspect is a parolee and the interrogation is taking 
place at the station house. A blanket rule in this situation would be 
closer to the "spirit" of Miranda 106 by providing meaningful protec­
tion for the fifth amendment rights of this class of individuals. 107 
The third possible reason for the Court's failure to address 
the parolee status issue is the concern with raising numerous re­
lated problems in other arguably custodial situations. This is the 
strongest argument for the position taken by the Court. If parolee 
status were to be recognized as a factor bearing upon custody, the 
Court would then be forced to deal with similar conditional release 
situations such as probation, prison furlough, work release, educa­
tional release and other pre-sentence release programs. Each of 
these situations contains elements similar to parolee status which 
bear upon the freedom of action of the individual. 108 In each case, 
the individual enjoys only a qualified liberty and is subject to some 
aspect of control by the state. The dangers of "custodial interroga­
tion" are present in some degree anytime one of these individuals 
is subjected to station house interrogation. 109 
blanket rule requiring Miranda warnings to be given all suspects who undergo 
polygraph tests at the sheriff's office). 
105. One commentator has noted that a police policy of automatically giving 
Miranda warnings to any suspect of a station house interrogation would eliminate 
many of the difficulties inherent in the determination of "custodial interrogation": 
"[Plolice can easily identify what constitutes 'custodial interrogation' where that 
concept is limited to questioning at the police station or a similar setting." Israel, 
supra note 11, at 1384 (footnote omitted). 
106. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1968) (the avowed purpose of 
Miranda is "to give meaningful protection to fifth amendment rights"). 
107. A blanket rule is only feasible in the context of a station house interroga­
tion. There the interrogation proceeds at a more leisurely pace and the interrogating 
officer can easily establish the suspect's parolee status and identify the proper point 
at which the warnings must be given. General on-the-street or on-the-scene question­
ing is not susceptible to such a blanket rule. It would be a great burden on police 
officers to attempt to establish the possible parolee status of every individual with 
whom they come in contact in the course of duty prior to asking them even the most 
elementary questions. 
108. Probation is the situation most analogous to that of parole. The basic dif­
ference is that parole is a post-prison procedure while probation is a pre-prison pro­
cedure. Probation has been justified under the same three theories used to justify 
parole. H. ABADINSKY, supra note 61, at 130-31. It has also been noted that the condi­
tions imposed on a probationer are markedly similar to those imposed upon a 
parolee. ld. at 184. 
109. See note 10 supra. 
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To lay down one rule applicable to all of these varied situa­
tions would be a difficult task. The source of the difficulty is the 
dissimilarity of the various pre-release programs. Each jurisdiction 
has developed its system independently, according to its own pol­
icy and philosophy.110 The particular conditions of release and dis­
cretion in revocation decisions vary greatlyl11 which makes it dif­
ficult to promulgate a universal rule on this basis. However, the 
Court could at least have dealt with the specific issue of "parolee 
status" raised in Mathiason. Justice Stevens' dissent indicates that 
the Court was aware of the particular problems raised by this is­
sue. 112 The analogous problems of similar conditional release pro­
grams could then be dealt with individually as they present them­
selves to the Court. 
In conclusion, the Mathiason Court adopted an objective de­
termination of "custody" as the proper standard for application of 
the Miranda principle, but ignored the suspect's parolee status in 
making this determination. Since the restraints imposed by parole 
significantly deprive an individual of his freedom, the issue merited 
consideration. In view of the importance of the constitutionally­
guaranteed rights involved,113 it is difficult to justify the Court's 
decision to avoid dealing with the parolee status issue. Undoubt­
edly, the Court will be required to face this issue again in the 
future. 114 At that time the issue should receive the careful analysis 
it deserves, rather than the cursory per curiam treatment afforded 
by the Mathiason Court. 
John J. Bogdanski 
llO. See L. CARNEY, supra note 58, at 148-52. 

lli. See note 76 supra and accompanying text. 

112. See note 14 supra. 
113. Miranda was intended to safeguard the individual's fifth amendment right 
against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 444. 
114. The issue of a station house interrogation of a parolee suspect will cer­
tainly be raised again. It is not uncommon for an individual on parole to be interro­
gated in relation to a recent crime. In'deed, it should be noted that, in the instant 
case, Mathiason became implicated in the crime because he was a "parolee and 
close associate" of the victim's son. See note 1 supra. As one commentator has noted, 
"In fact, for obvious reasons, every parolee is likely to be re-arrested, when a crime 
is committed in a small community and the perpetrator cannot be found im­
mediately. He is the suspect per se and it is little to be wondered at his first being 
arrested on suspicion." von Hentig, Degrees of Parole Violation and Graded Reme­
dial Measures, 33 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363, 366-67 (1943) (footnote omitted). 
